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Enhancing Temporal Logic Falsification with
Specification Transformation and Valued Booleans
Johan Lide´n Eddeland, Koen Claessen, Nicholas Smallbone, Zahra Ramezani, Sajed Miremadi, and Knut A˚kesson
Abstract—Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are systems with
both physical and software components, for example cars and
industrial robots. Since these systems exhibit both discrete and
continuous dynamics, they are complex and it is thus difficult to
verify that they behave as expected. Falsification of temporal logic
properties is an approach to find counterexamples to CPSs by
means of simulation. In this paper, we propose two additions to
enhance the capability of falsification and make it more viable in
a large-scale industrial setting. The first addition is a framework
for transforming specifications from a signal-based model into
Signal Temporal Logic. The second addition is the use of Valued
Booleans and an additive robust semantics in the falsification
process. We evaluate the performance of the additive robust
semantics on a set of benchmark models, and we can see that
which semantics are preferable depend both on the model and
on the specification.
Index Terms—Simulation, test generation, testing, embedded
systems
I. INTRODUCTION
ASSURING the quality of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs)is an important task that is growing more and more com-
plex. Industrial-size systems with both discrete and continuous
dynamics, i.e. hybrid systems, require durable methods for
design automation [1], as well as validation methods that are
beyond the current capabilities of e.g. model-checking [2].
Since the general problem of finding the set of reachable
states for this kind of systems is undecidable [3], we instead
resort to testing the systems. For testing and/or monitoring of
CPSs, there are many possible approaches (see [4], [5] for two
surveys) – in this work, we consider falsification of temporal
logic specifications. Another approach is deductive methods
for proving properties of CPSs [6], but in many industrial
applications there is no mathematical model to analyze, instead
there is only the possibility to simulate the system under
test. Falsification can be done for CPSs both with the actual
hardware, or as in the case of this paper, where the hardware
is being simulated.
Falsification of temporal logic specifications for CPSs is a
method which attempts to find counterexamples to properties
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of systems by optimization over robustness of the specifica-
tion. Here, robustness is a measure of distance to violation of
the specification. The falsification framework has been shown
to be useful for several different applications [7], [8], and it
can still be modified in many different ways. For example,
one can consider different optimization algorithms to search
for the counterexample (e.g. ant colony optimization [9] or
functional gradient descent [10]).
Falsification requires use of a formal specification, typically
written in Metric Interval Temporal Logic (MITL) [11] or
Signal Temporal Logic (STL) [12] (or some variant thereof).
However, these formal logics are not currently well established
in industry, since the specifications used in industry need to
be understood by engineers from many different disciplines.
This means that it can be difficult to apply falsification when
there is no formal specification available to test against.
In an attempt to tackle this problem, we present a framework
for transforming requirements modelled in a causal, signal-
based language (e.g. Simulink [13]) into specifications in STL.
This allows expert test engineers to model executable require-
ments using a tool they are familiar with, while also making
falsification possible for the models under development.
As an additional measure to enhance the falsification pro-
cess for industrial-size problems, we apply an alternative
robust semantics to be used in the falsification problem.
Specifically, we use the additive semantics presented for the
logical framework Valued Booleans [14]. We evaluate the
performance of additive semantics for several specifications
and see in which cases they are preferable to the “standard”
semantics of STL robustness. To be clear, these changes apply
when we attempt to falsify a specification by means of opti-
mization, rather than by performing brute-force exploration of
system executions.
A. Related work
The main focus of this paper is to adapt the framework of
falsification to work better in certain industrial applications.
The tools Breach [15] and S-TaLiRo [8] are used to perform
falsification with STL and MTL, respectively. Both of these
tools are based on the idea of a robustness measure for tem-
poral logic specifications [16]. Apart from falsification, recent
research has also focused on mining of temporal properties for
CPSs [17], which can make it easier to understand what proper
specifications could be, given simulations of a system. A
generalization of robustness is presented in a recent algebraic
framework for runtime verification [18].
There exist several approaches to transform models between
other design tools. In [19], the author presents a way to
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go from informal requirements to hybrid models with the
use of pattern templates. In [20], a method for generating
Simulink monitors from formal requirements is presented –
this procedure is essentially the opposite of the one presented
in this paper. In [21], a tool is introduced for translating
Simulink models into theories in the proof assistant Isabelle
[22]. To our knowledge, there has been no previous work trans-
forming causal signal-based specifications into STL formulas,
a transformation investigated in this paper.
When it comes to improvements of the falsification process
itself, previous work has defined a modified version of STL
[23], and there has been discussion showing the need for
similar modifications in industrial applications [24]. The main
point has been to improve the robustness information from
temporal operators by averaging the robustness inside the
timed intervals in question. Another novel approach, which
can include different interpretations of robustness for temporal
operators, views temporal logic as filtering [25]. This connects
the fields of temporal logic and signal processing and allows
for new ways of analysis.
Several works [26] [27] have designed methods for faster
falsification of a specific sub-class of specifications, namely
request-response specifications. Recently, an extension to fal-
sification has been proposed where meta-parameters of falsifi-
cation, e.g. the number of control points, are variable and put
into an outer optimization problem [28].
Valued Booleans [14] is a recently-proposed logic that
captures both the truth value of properties, as well as how
severely the properties are falsified. In this paper, we use
a version of Valued Booleans to enhance the capabilities of
falsification.
B. Contributions
The main contributions of this work are:
i) transformation of causal signal-based requirements into
STL specifications;
ii) application of Valued Boolean additive semantics to the
falsification process;
iii) evaluation of additive semantics for falsification of bench-
mark requirements.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section
II, STL and the falsification problem are defined. The latter is
used to evaluate different robust semantics later on. In Section
III, we define a framework for translating causal signal-based
specifications into STL. Section IV details the logic of Valued
Booleans, with two kinds of robust semantics. Section V
compares the two robust semantics in falsification for a set
of benchmark models, and in Section VI our conclusions are
presented.
II. SIGNAL TEMPORAL LOGIC AND FALSIFICATION
The specification language STL is widely used for falsifica-
tion of CPSs. We omit the definition of the robust semantics of
STL, as it is almost identical to the max semantics of VBools,
which we define in Section IV-A. For details on STL, we refer
the reader to other works [29].
A. Discrete-time signals
Throughout this paper, we discuss specifications defined for
signals and signal values. The semantics of VBools is in terms
of discrete-time signals, and for the sake of consistency we
also define STL this way, even though it is usually defined in
terms of continuous-time signals [30]. The main point of doing
this is to make it clear how temporal operators can be defined
in terms of conjunction, but generalizing to continuous time
is possible [31] [16]. For practical purposes, falsification and
monitoring of signals is performed on the output of simulated
systems, where time has to be discretized to numerically solve
the systems.
Definition 1: A discrete-time signal is a function x[k] from
a finite subset of I ⊂ Z to R, where k ∈ I . The set I labels the
time instants of the signals, and the signal takes on continuous
values at each of those time instants.
B. Signal Temporal Logic
The grammar of STL formulas is defined as
µ ::= x < r | x ≤ r | x ≥ r | x > r | x = r
ϕ ::= µ | ¬µ | ϕ ∧ ψ | [a,b]ψ | ϕ U[a,b]ψ,
where µ is a predicate, and ϕ and ψ are STL formulas. ∧
denotes logical and, [a,b] is the timed globally (or always)
operator, and U[a,b] is the timed until operator. Due to De
Morgan’s laws, we can define logical or ϕ ∨ ψ as ¬(¬ϕ ∧
¬ψ). There is a similar identity for the temporal operators,
which lets us define timed eventually ♦[a,b]ϕ as ¬([a,b]¬ϕ).
These identities will also be used in Section IV. We define the
validity of a formula ϕ similarly to earlier works [32].
We will provide an example of an STL specification for
clarity. The first example is a benchmark specification from
[33], informally stated as “During all simulation times, the
engine speed ω and the vehicle speed v never reach ω¯ and v¯,
respectively.” The corresponding STL formula is
φAT2 = ((ω < ω¯) ∧ (v < v¯)).
φAT2 contains two operators:  and ∧. The modal depth
of a formula is the deepest nesting of temporal operators (i.e.
,♦,U) in it. For φAT2 , the modal depth is 1.
C. Falsification
Temporal logic falsification is an approach to finding coun-
terexamples to models of CPSs, given a specification in
temporal logic. The problem of generating a test case for the
CPS is treated as an optimization problem, where one attempts
to minimize the robustness of the STL specification, given an
input parametrization of the system. Figure 1 illustrates the
main falsification procedure used in this paper (with the use
of the tool Breach), which we have adapted to use VBools
instead of STL robust semantics.
The Generator takes the input parametrization to generate
an input to the system under test. The Simulator generates a
simulation trace, which is used together with the specification
ϕ to evaluate VBool robustness for the simulation. The VBool
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Generator Simulator
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Function
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Specification
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Requirement ϕ
Falsified
Fig. 1: A flowchart describing a slightly modified version of the optimization-based falsification procedure of Breach. In this
paper we deal with the two shaded nodes: defining a specification transformer and using alternate robustness functions.
robustness is evaluated to see whether the specification is fal-
sified or not. If it is not falsified, new parameters are sampled
and the process is repeated. The Parameter Optimizer is a
global optimizer which attempts to find new input parameters
that are closer to falsifying the specification, i.e., parameters
that lead to a lower VBool robustness.
In this work, we investigate two modifications to the fal-
sification procedure. In Section III, we introduce a trans-
formation of signal-based requirements into STL (with a
specification transformer) as a means of allowing falsification
to be performed by testers who are not used to temporal logic
specifications. In Section IV, the logic of VBools is introduced
which allows the tester to control the objective function used
in the falsification optimization problem.
III. SIGNAL-BASED SPECIFICATIONS
As has been noted before [34], writing specifications in
temporal logic is not trivial. Approaches that have been used
to solve this problem are creating tools that make it easier
to write specifications [35], automatically detecting faulty
specifications [36], and defining template specifications to
make it easier for testers to formulate their requirements
formally [37]. In this paper, we instead allow test engineers to
write specifications in a formalism they already know, namely
a causal signal-based framework (here using Simulink [13]).
The main idea behind a signal-based safety specification
is to directly take signals from the simulated system, then
using different operators (blocks) to give an output signal
that at each simulated time instant is either 1 (specification
is fulfilled) or 0 (specification is not fulfilled). The advantage
of this is that a test can easily be automatically executed and
evaluated at the same time as the system itself is simulated.
By using a signal-based specification, we exploit the fact
that the test engineers are experts at expressing specifications
in, for example, Simulink. The drawback is that a signal-based
specification does not compute robustness values, and so can
not be directly used for falsification. To solve this problem,
we automatically translate signal-based specifications into STL
formulas to be used by Breach.
A. STL specifications in a signal-based framework
As an example, we wish to show an implementation of a
version of φAT1 from [33], which is defined as
'always'1
omega
Relational
Operator
1
reqLogical
Operator1
Unit	Delay
4500
omega_bar
Fig. 2: A simple example of a specification expressed in
Simulink. The natural language interpretation is “During all
simulation times t ∈ [0, T ], the engine speed ω never reaches
ω¯”. For the implementation to be correct, the initial condition
of the Unit Delay block must be non-zero.
φAT1 = (ω < ω¯). (1)
It should be noted that since a specification implemented in
Simulink must be causal, temporal operators that look forward
in time cannot be explicitly modeled. However, a specification
model with a similar meaning to φAT1 (with ω¯ = 4500) is
presented in Figure 2.
Assume that the specification is evaluated on a simulation
trace with a finite set of sampled data points K. The interpre-
tation of the signal req at sample k ∈ K is then
req[k] =
{
> if ω[k′] < 4500,∀k′ ∈ K ∩ [0, k]
⊥ otherwise, (2)
while the Boolean evaluation of the STL formula φAT1 at
time k can be informally expressed as
φAT1 [k] =
{
> if ω[k′] < 4500,∀k′ ∈ K ∩ [k, k + T ]
⊥ otherwise. (3)
As can be easily seen, req(k) is not equal to the Boolean
evaluation of φAT1 (k) for all k, but req(T ) = φ
AT
1 (0).
This is the only thing that is needed to achieve equivalence
between the Boolean interpretation of a causal signal-based
requirement and its STL equivalent, since the STL formula
will be evaluated for time 0, and the signal-based specification
will be evaluated at the final simulation time. We note that
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another possible approach to generate specifications in this
setting would be to consider past-time operators of STL,
instead of future-time operators as presented here.
B. Signal-based specifications expressed in STL
The goal is to be able to take any signal-based specification,
and then transform it into an STL formula so that it can be used
for falsification. Ideally, each signal in the signal-based model
would be assigned an STL formula, but since the semantics of
a signal-based framework are not typically equivalent to the
semantics of STL, they have different levels of expressivity.
In this section, a Signal is a variable that has defined
values over time, and it can be a scalar or a vector. A Signal
corresponds to a signal in a causal model. A Formula is a
special case of a Signal, namely a Signal that always has a
Boolean value (i.e. it is either true or false).
To model signals whose behaviour varies depending on the
value of a Boolean expression, we define the types FormulaT-
able and SignalTable as
FormulaTable = P(Formula× Formula) (4)
SignalTable = P(Formula× Signal), (5)
where P denotes the powerset operation. A FormulaTable
or SignalTable consists of a set of entries, where each entry is
a pair of a precondition, expressed as an STL formula, and
a consequent, which is the value taken by the formula or
signal when the precondition is true. The disjunction of all
preconditions for any FormulaTable or SignalTable must be
>.1
Figure 3 shows a Simulink encoding of the natural language
requirement “The engine speed ω should always be below
5000 RPM. Additionally, if we are in third gear or lower, the
speed v should be below 50 km/h; otherwise, the speed should
be below 200 km/h.” The Switch block assigns a value to its
output signal according to the rule:
if gear ≤ 3 then
sub1 = 50
else
sub1 = 200
end if
The signal sub1 is translated into a SignalTable, shown
in Table I. The signals sub2 and phi are translated into
FormulaTables, seen in Tables II and III respectively. Since
there are two conditions, the SignalTables and FormulaTables
have two entries. The SignalTable for sub1 has two entries
because it is the output of a Switch block; the FormulaTables
for sub2 and phi have two entries because the FormulaTable
for the output of a block has an entry for each possible
combination of preconditions from the block’s inputs.
1In particular, if a FormulaTable or SignalTable only has one entry, the
precondition in that entry must be >.
1
omega
5000
Constant
2
speed
	~=	0
Switch
3
gear
Relational
Operator3
Constant1
Relational
Operator1
50
Constant2
200
Constant3
Logical
Operator
1
phi
Relational
Operator3
sub1
sub2
Fig. 3: An example of a requirement with a conditional
statement, implemented with the use of a Simulink Switch
block.
TABLE I: The SignalTable for the signal sub1 in the Example
in Figure 3.
Precondition Consequent
gear < 3 50
¬(gear < 3) 200
TABLE II: The FormulaTable for the signal sub2 in the
Example in Figure 3.
Precondition Consequent
gear < 3 v < 50
¬(gear < 3) v < 200
TABLE III: The FormulaTable for the output phi in the
Example in Figure 3.
Precondition Consequent
gear < 3 (ω < 5000) ∧ (v < 50)
¬(gear < 3) (ω < 5000) ∧ (v < 200)
To transform a binary operator2, we construct the following
table:
{(prereq1 ∧ prereq2, operator(conseq1, conseq2))
| (prereq1, conseq1) ∈ in1, (prereq2, conseq2) ∈ in2}.
As can be seen, the operator of the block is applied to each
consequent of the table. The number of entries α in the table
that is produced from a block with K inputs u1, u2, . . . , uK
will be ΠKk=1αuk , where αuk is the number of entries in the
table of input uk.
An important difference between signal-based specifications
and STL specifications is due to conditional blocks. The
archetypical conditional block is the Switch block, which takes
three inputs and lets the output be either the first or the third
input, depending on a user-defined condition on the second
2A unary operator is a simplification of the algorithm presented. An n-ary
operator, for example ∧, is implemented pairwise (meaning that a ∧ b ∧ c is
transformed to (a∧ b)∧ c, which is possible due to associativity of both max
and additive semantics).
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input. The output table of a Switch block has α = α2(α1+α3)
entries.
To translate a FormulaTable into an STL formula, one can
consider the “STL semantics” for a Simulink switch (with
inputs x1, x2, x3) as either
(x2 ∧ x1) ∨ (¬(x2) ∧ x3) (6)
or
(x2 =⇒ x1) ∧ (¬(x2) =⇒ x3). (7)
Note that these two expressions are logically equivalent, but
they do not necessarily yield the same robustness value.
C. Recursive loops in specifications
To transform a signal-based specification into STL, we
perform a backwards depth-first search from the output of the
specification, assigning a FormulaTable or SignalTable to each
signal in the specification. For simple specifications without
loops, the search algorithm discussed will terminate and assign
an STL formula to the signal leading to the outport of the
specification. However, any kind of temporal behaviour in
a specification is typically implemented as a recursive loop,
which leads to the basic search algorithm not terminating –
something that needs to be taken care of when transforming
the STL formula.
1) Handling recursive loops, approach 1: If the length
of the simulation is known and finite, we can transform a
recursive loop into a formula that explicitly computes its value
in terms of the values at all earlier time steps. For the example
presented in Figure 2, this corresponds to the final output
req(k) =
k∧
k′=0
(ω(k′) < ω¯). (8)
However, this results in large and potentially unreadable
STL formulas as soon as there is some recursion involved,
even for simple specifications. For example, given a simulation
time in [0, 10] and a fixed simulation step time of 0.01,
requirement (8) results in an STL specification with 1001 ∧-
connectives, and more than 31000 characters when written
in Breach syntax. Even though the robustness values for
the formula will still be the same as for the STL formula
ϕ = [0,10](ω(t) < ω¯), we typically want something that is
as readable as possible.
2) Handling recursive loops, approach 2: If it is a goal to
keep the automatically transformed STL formulas as short as
possible, we use templates of combinations of different tem-
poral operators that are implemented as their own subsystems
in the model. This is in a way very similar to ST-Lib [37],
but instead of defining templates that can be used to build
specifications from the ground up directly in STL, we define
templates in Simulink that are associated to predefined STL
formulas.
For the example in Figure 2, one such template could be the
 operator, which in practice would be a subsystem replacing
the blocks in the shaded area.
1
omega
2
v
omega_bar
omega_bar
v_bar
v_bar
Relational
Operator
Logical
Operator
Relational
Operator1
1
Out1
sig1
sig2
sig4
sig5
sig3
sig6
sig7
Fig. 4: An implementation of the STL specification (ω < ω¯)∧
(v < v¯), which is interpreted as ”The engine speed ω and the
vehicle speed v never reach ω¯ and v¯, respectively”.
TABLE IV: Some Possible Interpretations of the Specification
in Figure 4.
Logged signals STL Formula
- (ω < ω¯) ∧ (v < v¯)
sig1 (sig1 < ω¯) ∧ (v < v¯)
sig2 (ω < sig2) ∧ (v < v¯)
sig1, sig4 (sig1 < ω¯) ∧ (sig4 < v¯)
sig3 ¬(sig3 = 0) ∧ (v < v¯)
sig6 (ω < ω¯) ∧ ¬(sig6 = 0)
sig3, sig6 ¬(sig3 = 0) ∧ ¬(sig6 = 0)
sig7 ¬(sig7 = 0)
3) Handling recursive loops, approach 3: A final possi-
bility is to treat a recursive loop as a black box rather than
translating it to STL. To do this, we treat the output of the
delay block3 as a signal in the specification, i.e. consider
anything before the delay block to be part of the model.
The value of the signal is computed by the model, and the
STL specification simply refers to the signal. This approach
is useful when we want to avoid the inefficient encoding of
approach 1 and the recursive loop does not correspond to a
predefined template. It is also needed when a block applies a
general function to its input, in which case the function output
cannot be explicitly defined as a formula, but by treating the
function as part of the system we are still able to translate the
specification to STL.
To summarize our implementation, whenever there is a
recursive loop, approach 3 will be used unless there is a
template defined for the part of the model containing the
loop. If there is a template, approach 2 is used. This means
that the specification transformation is fully automatic, with
the possibility to include more detailed information about the
specification by the use of templates.
An extended example of this can be shown by considering
the signal-based specification in Figure 4. The specification
itself is part of φAT2 [33]. Some different ways to interpret
this specification, based on which of the given signals are
considered as part of the model (logged signals), are shown
in Table IV.
The advantage of this approach is that we can be certain
to translate any signal-based specification to STL, while the
disadvantage is that the generated STL specification might be
3Note that a delay block must be present in the loop, otherwise it would
be an algebraic loop.
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less suited to falsification than had we translated the recursive
loops to STL. For example, the specification (ω < ω¯) ∧ (v <
v¯) (for the Automatic Transmission benchmark) has many
possible robustness values since the signals ω and v have
many different potential values. However, the specification
¬(sig7 = 0) (which has exactly the same Boolean truth
value) only has two possible robustness values. This makes
falsification harder, since the optimization solver will not see
how close the specification came to failing.
The claim above about being able to translate any signal-
based specification to STL is a very strong one, as there are
specifications that can be modeled using e.g. Simulink that
cannot be expressed in STL, see [38]. However, the solution
presented here is that if there is a block that is not expressible
in STL, its output will be logged (and the block is therefore
not explicitly stated using STL, as that would be impossible).
Also, specific temporal behaviours that are not expressible in
STL result in logging of certain blocks as explained earlier in
this section, which means that we can indeed transform any
requirement to STL, however parts of the requirement may not
be stated explicitly. Providing a formal proof of the correctness
of the translation is beyond the scope of this paper, and instead
considered future work. We note, however, that such a formal
proof may be problematic due to non-standard semantics of
Simulink [39].
D. When semantics do not match
For the specification transformation framework presented
in this paper, there is a difference between logical formulas
and signals. However, in a signal-based setting there is not,
so it is possible for a block to get the wrong type of input.
For example, consider the expected inputs and outputs of the
following blocks:
∧ : FormulaTable× FormulaTable→ FormulaTable
< : SignalTable× SignalTable→ FormulaTable
+ : SignalTable× SignalTable→ SignalTable
There are two cases for unexpected input types: either a
SignalTable is provided when a FormulaTable should be, or a
FormulaTable is provided when a SignalTable should be.
1) SignalTable provided instead of FormulaTable: This can
occur if, for example, we apply the ∧ operator to two real-
valued signals x and y. Simulink (and MATLAB) semantics
interpret the Boolean evaluation of these signals as being false
if they are equal to zero, and true otherwise. This means
that we can transform a SignalTable to a FormulaTable by
comparing equality of the SignalTable’s consequent to zero,
and then applying the ¬ operator. This is accomplished by the
S2F function:
S2F : SignalTable→ FormulaTable
S2F (〈precond, conseq〉) = 〈precond,¬(conseq = 0)〉
2) FormulaTable provided instead of SignalTable: This can
occur if, for example, we try to add (using the + operator)
two predicates, such as x > 0 and y < 10. The meaning
of this is clear when interpreted as signals according to the
Simulink semantics: the output of the + operator will have
value 0 (when both predicates are false), 1 (when exactly one
of the predicates are true), or 2 (when both predicates are
true). However, in STL we cannot define a formula by adding
logical formulas together.
In this case, if the sum is later used as a formula by
comparing it to zero (i.e. the signal expression to be evaluated
is
(
(x > 0)+(y < 10)
)
= 0), then an equivalent STL formula
would be ¬((x > 0)∨ (y < 10)). However, it is not clear how
to generalize this observation, so instead we consider anything
before the block in question (here, the + operator) to be a
black box, and the output of the block is treated as a signal,
using the same method described in Section III-C3.
IV. VALUED BOOLEANS
Valued Booleans (VBools) [14] is a logical framework in
which the tester can customize how robustness is computed
by choosing between several possible semantics for each
connective. The semantics that are currently available are a
max semantics (which is essentially the same as STL) and an
additive semantics.
A VBool is formally defined as a pair of a Boolean value
and a robustness value. The robustness is a non-negative
number, which may be infinite:
V = B× R≥0
Note the difference between VBools and STL. In STL,
there is no explicit Boolean value, but the robustness may
be negative, and negative robustness represents falsehood. For
VBools, the Boolean value is explicit and robustness may not
be negative.
The VBool comparison operator ≤v is defined as:
≤v : R× R→ V
x ≤v y =
{
(>, y − x) if x ≤ y
(⊥, x− y) otherwise.
> and ⊥ denote true and false, respectively. The other
comparison operators are defined in terms of ≤v , except for
=v which is defined as
x =v y =
{
(>,K) if x = y
(⊥,K) otherwise,
where K is an arbitrary constant. Truth values and negation
are defined as
>v = (>,∞)
⊥v = (⊥,∞)
¬v(b, x) = (¬b, x).
The rest of the operators are defined in two different ways.
One is called max semantics and the other additive semantics.
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A. Max semantics
The max and operator is defined as
(>, x) ∧max (>, y) = (>,min(x, y))
(⊥, x) ∧max (>, y) = (⊥, x)
(>, x) ∧max (⊥, y) = (⊥, y)
(⊥, x) ∧max (⊥, y) = (⊥,max(x, y)).
The first clause models the idea that in order to falsify x∧y,
it is enough to falsify whichever of x and y has the lowest
robustness. If we are in the second clause, then x∧ y is false,
and in order to make it true, we must make x true; the third
clause is similar. The final clause is dual to the first clause: in
order to make x∧y true we must make both x and y true, and
the robustness is determined by whichever of x and y seems
to be hardest to make true, i.e., has the highest robustness as
a false VBool.
The max or operator is defined in terms of the max and
operator: (bx, x)∨max(by, y) = ¬v(¬v(bx, x)∧max¬v(by, y)).
The timed max always operator (over the interval [a, b]) is
also defined in terms of the max and operator as
max,[a,b]ϕ =
b∧
max
k=a
ϕ[k],
where ϕ is a finite sequence of VBools defined for all the
discrete time instants in [a, b].
The timed max eventually-operator is defined as
♦max,[a,b]ϕ = ¬(max,[a,b](¬vϕ)). Finally, for completeness
we also define the max until-operator as
ϕ Umax,[a,b] ψ
=
b∨
max
k=a
(
ψ ∧max
(
b−1∧
max
k′=a
ϕ[k′]
))
.
It can be seen that the max semantics for VBool are almost
equivalent to the robust semantics of STL, with the only
difference being that VBools distinguish between “true with
robustness 0” and “false with robustness 0”, while STL does
not. This difference is only technical and in practice the two
semantics behave the same. However, a single VBool formula
can contain both max connectives and connectives using other
semantics, such as the additive semantics defined below.
B. Additive semantics
The additive and-operator is defined as4
(>, x) ∧+ (>, y) =
(
>, 11
x +
1
y
)
(⊥, x) ∧+ (>, y) = (⊥, x)
(>, x) ∧+ (⊥, y) = (⊥, y)
(⊥, x) ∧+ (⊥, y) = (⊥, x+ y).
4In the case where both x and y are true, but either x or y is 0, we define
the resulting robustness to be 0. This to avoid division by 0, and 0 is also the
limit of the expression as x or y goes to 0.
As with the max semantics, the additive semantics for ∧ is
based on the observation that in order to falsify x ∧ y, it is
enough to falsify either x or y. The first clause is inspired by
the formula for parallel resistance; the formula 1/(1/x+1/y)
gives a robustness which is less than the maximum of x and y.
It roughly models the idea that although we need only falsify
one of x and y, we do not know which one of them can be
falsified. The second and third clauses are the same as in the
max semantics. By using addition in the fourth clause rather
than max, we model the idea that in order to make x∧y true,
we need to make both x and y true, not just whichever of
them has the highest robustness.
The additive or-operator is defined as (bx, x) ∨+ (by, y) =
¬v(¬v(bx, x) ∧+ ¬v(by, y)), and the timed additive always-
operator (over the time interval [a, b]) is defined (similar to
the max case) as
+,[a,b]ϕ =
b∧
+
k=a
(ϕ[k]#′δt),
where ϕ is a finite sequence of VBools defined for the time
instants in [a, b], δt is the simulation step time for the time
point in question, and #′ is defined as
(⊥, x)#′k = (⊥, x · k)
(>, x)#′k = (>, x/k).
The use of #′ makes the robustness independent of the sim-
ulation time step, and means that the robustness of +,[a,b]ϕ,
if ϕ is false over the interval [a, b], is equal to the integral of
the robustness of ϕ over [a, b].
The timed additive eventually-operator is defined as
♦+,[a,b]ϕ = ¬(+,[a,b](¬vϕ)) .
The additive until-operator is defined as
ϕ U+,[a,b] ψ
=
b∨
+
k=a
(ψ[k]#′δt) ∧+
b−1∧
+
k′=a
(ϕ[k′]#′δt)
 .
Implication is defined slightly differently than in classical
logic:
φ→+ ψ = ¬(φ#k) ∨ ψ.
Here k is an arbitrary constant, and # scales the robustness
of its argument:
(⊥, x)#k = (⊥, x · k)
(>, x)#k = (>, x · k).
By scaling the left-hand side of the implication, we encourage
the parameter optimizer to make the left-hand side true before
trying to falsify the right-hand side.
C. Properties for reasoning about Valued Booleans
Most Valued Boolean connectives have two possible se-
mantics, and the tester must choose one of the semantics
for each connective in the specification. The max semantics
corresponds closely to the existing robust semantics of STL
(and for use in falsification, they yield the same result), but the
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additive semantics is entirely different. The purpose of using
max semantics for Valued Booleans instead of STL robustness
is so that the tester can freely change between different robust
semantics of VBools, even within a single formula. This
section compares the two semantics of Valued Booleans and
describes the different properties they have which explain why
a tester might choose to use one or the other. For a more
thorough discussion on Valued Booleans, we refer the reader
to the work which introduced them [14]. This section rather
discusses the practical issues of using Valued Booleans in the
case of falsification.
The ultimate goal of a robust semantics is to guide the
falsification in the right direction. Therefore, when a change
in the input to the system brings a formula closer to being
falsified, the robustness of the formula should go down. This
is the property we ideally want from a robust semantics. It is
not always achievable in reality (because we can never be sure
if we are really moving closer to a counterexample or not),
but the more often it holds, the better. We are particularly
interested in two special cases of this property, monotonicity
and sensitivity. For simplicity we assume that formulas are in
negation normal form, i.e., negation only occurs as part of an
atomic formula.
Definition 2: A formula is monotonic if, when the robustness
of some atomic subformula decreases (leaving the others
unchanged), the robustness of the formula does not increase.
A nonmonotonic formula is disastrous for falsification as
the parameter optimizer will, moving from a test case to a
strictly better one, observe the better test case as being worse
instead. All VBool formulas are monotonic.
Definition 3: A formula is sensitive if changing the ro-
bustness of some atomic subformula (leaving the others un-
changed) causes a change in the robustness of the formula.
This captures the idea that if the output of the system changes
then the robustness of the formula should usually change.
1) Importance of sensitivity for falsification: Sensitivity is
vital for falsification because measuring changes in robustness
is how the parameter optimizer explores the input space. For
falsification it is only important that true formulas be sen-
sitive if the falsification stops immediately when the counter-
example is found (and robustness thus is equal to 0). If moving
from a test case to a strictly better test case does not affect
robustness, then the parameter optimizer will not know when
it has found a better test case. The traditional semantics of
Boolean logic is completely insensitive, which is why a robust
semantics is needed for falsification.
Unfortunately, the max semantics is not sensitive: only one
parameter of p ∧ q is taken into account for any given test
case. For example, if p ∧ q is true, then the semantics is only
sensitive to changes in whichever of p and q has the lowest
robustness.
The additive semantics is sensitive for many true formulas.
For example, p∧q is fully sensitive when p and q are both true.
This means that, when falsifying the conjunction of several
formulas, the parameter optimizer is able to observe changes
in the robustness of any of the subformulas. However, the
formula p ∨ q is not fully sensitive when exactly one of its
arguments is true.
2) Example of max and additive semantics: Figure 5 il-
lustrates why sensitivity is important to falsification. Suppose
that the formula to be falsified is φ, and that this formula
happened to be true in the current test case. Figure 5(a)
illustrates how the robustness of φ varies with time in this
hypothetical test case. Recall that φ is computed by sampling
φ at each time step and taking the conjunction of each sample,
up to a constant factor depending on δt. In this case, the
robustness dips from 3 to 1 at about t = 48s, and in both
semantics, the robustness of φ will be lower compared to if
the robustness had been a constant 3.
Now suppose that the optimizer modifies the test case and
observes the output seen in Figure 5(b). It seems that this test
case is closer to failing than Figure 5(a), because there is an
extra dip in robustness. Therefore, we would like the optimiser
to prefer (b) to (a), and for this to happen the robustness
of φ must be lower under (b) than (a). Under the additive
semantics, this is indeed the case, because of sensitivity. Under
the max semantics, however, Figures 5(a) and (b) give the
same robustness for φ, as the minimum robustness is the
same in both cases. Thus the optimiser is not able to see that
moving from Figure 5(a) to 5(b) is a good idea. Because the
max semantics is not sensitive, the parameter optimizer is only
able to notice changes in the minimum value of φ.
It is not always the case that additive semantics is better than
max semantics. Suppose instead that the optimizer observes
the result in Figure 5(c). This test case appears much closer
to failing than Figure 5(a): the minimum is very close to
0. However, the additive semantics will assign Figure 5(c) a
higher robustness than Figure 5(a), because the initial segment
of the test case has a higher robustness and continues for a
long time, which cancels out the lower minimum. The max
semantics considers 5(c) to have lower robustness than 5(a),
as we might hope.
This problem only occurs because the robustness of the
initial segment of the test case is quite large. Figure 5(d)
shows a less extreme variant. Both the additive and the max
semantics judge this test case as having lower robustness than
Figure 5(a). This is because, if we take two true VBools (>, x)
and (>, y), their conjunction under the additive semantics is
(>, z) where z = 1/(1/x + 1/y). Now we can observe that
if x y, then 1x  1y , so z = 1/( 1x + 1y ) ≈ x. That is, when
taking the conjunction of a set of formulas, formulas that have
a low robustness have a disproportionate effect on the result. In
particular, in the formula ϕ, a small decrease in the minimum
value cancels out quite a large increase in the maximum value.
We also note that 1/(1/x+1/y) is always less than min(x, y),
i.e., the additive robustness of a conjunction between two true
VBools is always smaller than the max robustness. However,
as there is no meaning in explicitly comparing the additive
robustness value to the max, this does not affect our choice of
robustness in any way.
Figure 6 illustrates the robustness of p ∧+ q and p ∧max q.
The x-axis gives the robustness of p and the y-axis gives the
robustness of q; negative values here stand for false VBools.
The graph illustrates the robustness of p ∧ q using isolines,
which connect points that have equal robustness. Where an
isoline is vertical or horizontal, the connective is insensitive:
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Fig. 5: Four graphs showing the value of a hypothetical property φ over time. The different definitions of robustness assign
a different robustness to φ. In trace (a), robustness is lowest at about 48 seconds. In (b), the property comes close to being
falsified twice, at 20 seconds and 48 seconds. (c) is similar to (a), but the robustness in the initial part of the trace is even
higher. (d) is similar to (c), but with a slightly lower robustness between 2 and 44 seconds.
only changes in a particular argument have an effect on
robustness. We see in the upper-right quadrant that when p and
q have very different robustnesses, p∧+ q assigns much more
importance to the lower robustness (it starts to approximate
the max semantics), but that it always remains sensitive. This
weighting is a deliberate feature of the additive semantics: a
subformula with low robustness is likely to be a better target
for optimization than a subformula with high robustness, as it
it more likely to be easily falsifiable.
D. Other properties of VBools
Apart from monotonicity and sensitivity, there are several
more commonplace properties that we would like our se-
mantics to have. The most essential is soundness: a Valued
Boolean formula (e.g. p∧+(¬V q∨+r)) and the corresponding
Boolean formula (in this case, p ∧ (¬q ∨ r) should always
evaluate to the same Boolean result; the only difference is
that the Valued Boolean also computes a robustness. All of the
connectives we have defined are easily seen to be sound, since
the Boolean part of each definition uses the corresponding
Boolean connective. Therefore, the choice of semantics only
affects the optimization process, not the truth or falsehood of
the property.
We would also like the usual laws of Boolean logic to hold:
connectives should be associative, commutative, idempotent,
have an identity element, have a zero element, and obey the
usual distributivity and negation laws. As mentioned above,
these laws all hold if one ignores the computed robustness,
but we would like robustness to respect these laws too. These
properties are important because we do not want the robustness
of a formula to depend on, for example, how conjunctions are
bracketed or what order they are written in, and we do not
want the tester to have to think about what arrangement of
brackets is most suitable.
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(a) The robustness of x ∧+ y.
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(b) The robustness of x ∧max y.
Fig. 6: Isobar plots of the robustness of the two semantics of
∧. Here, negative robustnesses represent false VBools.
The max semantics obeys many laws of Boolean logic.
Conjunction and disjunction are associative, commutative,
idempotent and have >v and ⊥v as identity and zero elements.
Distributivity holds, as do De Morgan’s laws. What fails are
the laws p∨max¬vp = > and p∧max¬vp = ⊥, since the left
and right hand sides may have different robustnesses. Proofs
of these laws for VBools are omitted due to space constraints,
but they are straightforward and only require an exhaustive
case analysis on whether each VBool is true or false.
The additive connectives satisfy fewer laws than the max
semantics. They are associative, commutative, have >v and ⊥v
as identity and zero elements, and respect de Morgan’s laws.
They do not satisfy idempotence or distributivity. Idempotence
fails because, for example, p∧+ p is a Valued Boolean whose
robustness is either twice that of p (if p is false) or half that
of p (if p is true). Distributivity fails for a similar reason,
because expanding p ∧+ (q ∨+ r) duplicates p, increasing its
influence on the robustness computation. We are not aware
of a semantics that combines associativity, commutativity,
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idempotence and sensitivity; we conjecture that these four
properties are incompatible.5
To summarise, both max and additive semantics satisfy
many Boolean properties, but max satisfies more; in return
for giving up some properties, the additive semantics gains
sensitivity, which is useful for falsification. In an additive
conjunction, the parameter optimizer is able to see when any
of the conjuncts’ robustness decreases, which is not the case
for the max semantics. A final observation is that the additive
semantics for conjunction assigns greater weight to less robust
conjuncts, which means that when a conjunct is close to being
falsified it can be reduced even if this causes the robustness
of other conjuncts to increase markedly.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
To show the performance of using additive semantics for
STL during falsification (compared to max semantics), we per-
form falsification with additive semantics for four examples.
Each of the four examples comes from (or is inspired by) other
work, so we refer the reader to these original works for further
details about each model. The results are presented in a set of
tables, and the layout of each table is the same. The results
are shown in Sections V-A - V-D.
The rows of the tables show which specification is attempted
to be falsified, which parameters or specific settings are used,
and also which semantics are used. We use the max and
additive semantics defined earlier in the paper, but we also
include a third constant semantics. The robustness value for
a constant semantics is equal to 100 if the specification is
true, and -100 if the specification is not true. This constant
semantics is used as a baseline to verify whether max and
additive semantics yield better results than random testing6.
For each parameter setting, the “Succ” column shows how
many times the specification was actually falsified, and the
“Iter” column shows the average number of iterations used
by the optimization solver in each falsification attempt (the
maximum is set to 1000). The “Iter/Succ” column shows
the average number of iterations for the falsification attempts
that were successful. The optimization solver used in these
examples is a Simulated Annealing solver [40].
The specifications to falsify for the Automatic Transmission,
Abstract Fuel Control, and ∆ − Σ modulator are shown in
Table V. Specifications ϕAT1 –ϕ
AT
6 are taken from [23]. Note,
however, that we do not modify the specifications to improve
the falsification capability of our additive semantics. The
specifications for AFC are variations of Req. (26) and (27)
in [41], using η = 1.
A. Automatic Transmission Benchmark
The model takes as input the throttle and brake of a vehicle,
and simulates the automatic transmission system (for details,
5One could for example recover idempotence by multiplying or dividing
by 2 in the definition of ∧+, but this would destroy associativity.
6We have also implemented a random semantics, where the robustness at
each sample is a uniform random number, but with correct sign (for STL
robustness). Falsification for random semantics performs worse than max,
additive and constant semantics for all the examples in this paper.
TABLE V: Specifications to falsify for Automatic Transmis-
sion, Abstract Fuel Control, and Third Order ∆−Σ modulator
benchmarks.
Specification Formula
ϕAT1 ♦[0,T ](ω ≥ 2000)
ϕAT2 ♦[0,T ](ω ≤ 3500 ∨ ω ≥ 4500)
ϕAT3 [0,T ](¬(gear == 4))
ϕAT4 ♦([0,T ](gear == 3))
ϕAT5
∧
i=1,...,4 ((¬(gear == i) ∧ ♦[0,](gear == i)
=⇒ ([,T+](gear == i)))
ϕAT6 [0,T ](v ≤ 85) ∨ ♦(ω ≥ 4500)
ϕAT7 ([0,1]gear == 1) ∧ ([2,4]gear == 2)
∧([5,7]gear == 3) ∧ ([8,10]gear == 3)
∧([12,15]gear == 2)
ϕAT8 [0,20]
(
(gear == 4 ∧ throttle > 45
∧throttle < 50) =⇒ ω < ω¯)
ϕAFC1 [11,40](|
λ(t)−λref
λref
| < tol)
ϕAFC2 [11,35]
(
(θ(t) < θ(t+ 0.01) ∨ θ(t) > θ(t+ 0.01))
=⇒ [1,5](|λ−λrefλref | < tol)
)
ϕ∆−Σ1 
(∧3
i=1(−1 ≤ xi ∧ xi ≤ 1)
)
.
see [33]). The model has been used in several other works [17],
[23], and in this work we perform falsification with the Breach
toolbox. The outputs of the system are the vehicle speed (v),
the engine speed (ω), and the gear. The model contains 69
blocks in total.
The model is simulated with a fixed-step setting (automatic
step size), using the MATLAB solver ode5 (Dormand-Prince).
1) Falsification parameters: The throttle is generated using
7 control points distributed evenly in time, interpolated using
the MATLAB interpolation setting pchip. Each control point
has a value in the range [0, 100]. The brake input is interpolated
similarly but only using 3 control points, each in the range
[0, 500]. The comparison between max semantics and additive
semantics for each specification is shown in Table VI.
B. Abstract Fuel Control Benchmark
The model is an Abstract Fuel Control system implemented
in Simulink, and it has been proposed as a benchmark for
temporal logic falsification [41]. The inputs to the model are
the input throttle θ (in degrees) and the engine speed ω. The
outputs of interest are the Air/Fuel ratio λ and the controller
mode (either closed-loop or open-loop). The reference value
λref is equal to 14.7 for the specifications we are considering.
The model contains 253 blocks in total.
The model is simulated with a variable-step setting using
the MATLAB solver ode15s (stiff/NDF).
1) Falsification parameters: The engine speed is constant
and allowed to be in the range [900, 1100]. The throttle angle
is generated as a pulse signal with a base value of 8.9, a
delay of 3, a period in the range [10, 30] and amplitude in the
range [0.161]. Thus, the throttle angle always has a value in
the range [8.9, 69.9], always switching back and forth between
two values at different times of each simulation. We always
simulate the system for 40 seconds.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER-AIDED DESIGN OF INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS 11
TABLE VI: Results for the automatic transmission benchmark.
Specification Semantics Parameters
T = 20 T = 30 T = 40
Succ Iter Iter/Succ Succ Iter Iter/Succ Succ Iter Iter/Succ
ϕ1
Max 20 103.1 103.1 19 209.1 167.5 14 500.6 286.6
Additive 20 80.3 80.3 20 133.2 133.2 20 215.1 215.1
Constant 14 734.0 619.9 3 930.5 536.3 0 1000.0 -
T = 10
Succ Iter Iter/Succ
ϕ2
Max 16 247.9 59.9
Additive 20 172.1 172.1
Constant 20 277.3 277.3
T = 4 T = 4.5 T = 5
Succ Iter Iter/Succ Succ Iter Iter/Succ Succ Iter Iter/Succ
ϕ3
Max 0 1000.0 - 9 796.4 547.6 17 467.8 373.9
Additive 0 1000.0 - 10 736.0 472.0 17 532.9 450.4
Constant 0 1000.0 - 11 641.9 348.8 16 472.9 341.1
T = 1 T = 2
Succ Iter Iter/Succ Succ Iter Iter/Succ
ϕ4
Max 5 852.7 410.8 20 182.0 182.0
Additive 6 795.2 317.3 20 90.6 90.6
Constant 1 998.4 967.0 20 160.0 160.0
T = 0.8 T = 1 T = 2
Succ Iter Iter/Succ Succ Iter Iter/Succ Succ Iter Iter/Succ
ϕ5
Max 0 1000.0 - 12 754.4 590.7 20 60.1 60.1
Additive 0 1000.0 - 4 864.5 322.5 20 90.7 90.7
Constant 0 1000.0 - 13 704.6 545.5 20 64.7 64.7
T = 10 T = 12
Succ Iter Iter/Succ Succ Iter Iter/Succ
ϕ6
Max 9 731.4 403.0 20 153.5 153.5
Additive 12 665.9 443.1 20 182.9 182.9
Constant 0 1000.0 - 4 899.1 495.5
Succ Iter Iter/Succ
ϕ7
Max 4 905.4 527.0
Additive 15 493.3 324.4
Constant 4 836.7 183.5
ωˆ = 3000 ωˆ = 3500
Succ Iter Iter/Succ Succ Iter Iter/Succ
ϕ8
Max 20 16.9 16.9 0 1000.0 -
Additive 20 20.4 20.4 19 296.1 259.1
Constant 20 10.1 10.1 0 1000.0 -
The results for the Abstract Fuel Control benchmark are
shown in Table VII.
C. Third Order ∆− Σ Modulator
The third order ∆−Σ modulator is used as a technique for
analog to digital conversion. The model is described in detail
in [42] and has previously been used for falsification bench-
mark purposes [40], [28]. The model has one input U , three
states x1, x2, x3, and three initial conditions xinit1 , x
init
2 , x
init
3 .
The model contains 27 blocks in total.
The model is simulated with a fixed-step setting (automatic
step size), using the MATLAB solver discrete (no continuous
states).
1) Falsification parameters and specification: The input U
is constant during the whole simulation, and the allowed values
are in different sets for different scenarios (see Table VIII for
detailed scenarios). The initial conditions are all in the range
[−0.1, 0.1].
The results for the modulator benchmark are shown in Table
VIII.
D. Static Switched System
The static switched system has no dynamics and is included
to show that both max and additive semantics can worsen
the performance of falsification, compared to falsifying with
Boolean semantics. The model is inspired by [43], and it has
two inputs (u1, u2) ∈ [0, 1]2 which are kept constant. The
model contains 16 blocks in total. The output y(t) is assigned
according to
y =
{
−2(u1 + u2)− 5 if ui ≥ thresh, ∀i
2((u1 + 1)
2 + (u2 + 1)
2) otherwise.
The specification to falsify is ϕSS = (y ≥ 0). In other
words, the falsification problem consists of finding a scenario
where both inputs have a value above thresh. This is difficult
since the gradient of the robustness (for max and additive)
with respect to the input parameters will point away from the
area where the specification is falsified. The results for the
static switched system are shown in Table IX.
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TABLE VII: Results for the Abstract Fuel Control benchmark.
Specification Semantics Parameters
tol = 0.16 tol = 0.17 tol = 0.18
Succ Iter Iter/Succ Succ Iter Iter/Succ Succ Iter Iter/Succ
ϕAFC1
Max 20 313.2 313.2 9 758.6 463.7 3 934.1 560.7
Additive 19 589.2 567.6 7 837.8 536.6 2 962.0 620.0
Constant 14 564.4 377.7 2 967.8 678.0 1 971.1 423.0
tol = 0.16 tol = 0.17 tol = 0.18
Succ Iter Iter/Succ Succ Iter Iter/Succ Succ Iter Iter/Succ
ϕAFC2
Max 20 319.4 319.4 7 786.6 390.4 2 954.8 548.0
Additive 19 545.5 521.6 2 942.8 428.0 2 962.5 625.5
Constant 12 680.8 468.0 3 937.8 585.0 3 929.1 527.7
TABLE VIII: Results for the Third Order ∆− Σ modulator.
Specification Semantics Parameters
U ∈ [−0.35, 0.35] U ∈ [−0.40, 0.40] U ∈ [−0.45, 0.45]
Succ Iter Iter/Succ Succ Iter Iter/Succ Succ Iter Iter/Succ
ϕ∆−Σ1
Max 12 799.7 666.2 19 281.6 243.7 20 144.3 144.3
Additive 20 296.8 296.8 20 335.1 335.1 12 730.8 551.3
Constant 20 205.5 205.5 17 513.3 427.4 4 875.0 374.8
TABLE IX: Results for the Static Switched System.
Specification Semantics Parameters
thresh = 0.7 thresh = 0.8 thresh = 0.9
Succ Iter Iter/Succ Succ Iter Iter/Succ Succ Iter Iter/Succ
ϕSS
Max 15 566.3 421.7 10 741.1 482.2 3 937.7 584.7
Additive 16 518.4 397.9 7 861.3 603.7 3 943.3 622.0
Constant 20 118.3 118.3 20 136.1 136.1 20 373.4 373.4
E. Transforming Volvo requirements to STL
We have successfully implemented the framework presented
in this paper for transforming causal signal-based specifica-
tions into STL. We have transformed the requirements for
two industrial models at Volvo Car Corporation, which model
the electric machine of an electric vehicle, as well as the
battery for an electric vehicle. The models contain 19846
and 18294 blocks, respectively (including referenced models).
Note that the specifications have not been translated manually,
only automatically using the procedure presented in this paper.
For all the automatically translated specifications, correctness
has been asserted during falsification runs, i.e., the Boolean
satisfaction of the translated formulas have coincided with
the signal value of the specification modeled in Simulink.
However, a formal proof of the correctness is out of the scope
of this paper, and is considered future work.
In total, there are 58 transformed requirements for the first
model and 36 transformed requirements for the second model.
The transformation of requirements into STL specifications
have enabled the use of temporal logic falsification for both
models. Falsification is now being run continuously for both
models, in order to catch software defects during development.
Statistics for the transformed STL formulas are shown in
Table X. The sheer number of requirements combined with
the complexity of the formulas shown in the table indicate
that writing the specifications in STL manually would be very
time-consuming.
F. Discussion
For the specifications shown in this paper, we can see that
no specific semantics perform better than the other two for
all models. For several specifications, the constant semantics
performs just as well as one or other of the robust semantics.
It is clear from the tables that sometimes max semantics
are preferable, and sometimes additive semantics are prefer-
able. For example, for specifications ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ7, ϕ8 additive
semantics clearly perform better, while for specifications
ϕ5, ϕ6, ϕ
AFC
1 , ϕ
AFC
2 max semantics clearly perform better.
The static switched system was also introduced to show that
the constant semantics (i.e. random testing) can be better than
max or additive semantics. It is clear that ϕSS is easier to
falsify for the constant semantics than for the other semantics.
Whether a specific semantics outperforms the others de-
pends not only on the specification, but also on the system
that is being falsified.
1) Preferable semantics for different specifications: The
intuitive explanation for why additive semantics can be better
in some cases is that it takes into account all the different
subformulas of ∧ and ∨ formulas (and by extension also
the temporal operators). In a conjunction, if only the highest
robustness value decreases in between simulations, it is not
certain that the max semantics will capture the change, but it
will affect the total additive robustness. On the other hand, if
one robustness increases while the other robustness decreases,
the additive semantics robustness may not be affected, while
the max semantics robustness will.
An example of when it is preferable to notice changes in all
clauses of a conjunction is ϕ7. Here, each clause is not difficult
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TABLE X: Statistics of STL Formulas for the two Volvo models.
Model
Number of operators Depth Modal depth
Min Mean Max Min Mean Max Min Mean Max
Electric machine 1 61.1 336 1 7.65 15 1 2.02 4
Battery 2 33.5 171 1 7.95 16 1 2.08 4
to falsify individually, but to be able to falsify them all at
once it helps a great deal to include more detailed robustness
information about each clause. As such, having conjunctions
with many clauses in a specification can indicate that additive
semantics would be preferable for that (sub)-specification.
2) Preferable semantics for different systems: For some
system behaviour, it can be non-beneficial to consider changes
in all parts of a conjunction. An example of this is the third
order ∆ − Σ modulator. One of the three clauses in the
conjunction is by far the easiest sub-specification of ϕ∆−Σ1 to
falsify. Including more detailed robustness information about
the other sub-specifications makes the robustness information
from this ”easiest” specification diluted in a sense, meaning
that changing from max to additive semantics will not increase
falsification capability.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented two additions to potentially increase the
capability of falsification of temporal logic specification for
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs).
The first addition is a specification transformation frame-
work, which takes requirements modeled in a causal signal-
based frameworks and transforms them into Signal Temporal
Logic (STL) formulas. The framework has been implemented
for the specifications in two industrial-sized models at Volvo
Car Corporation, and it has enabled the use of falsification for
both of the models. The specification transformation outputs
a specification where we also have information about which
preconditions should be fulfilled for different parts of the
specification to be evaluated.
The second addition is the introduction of additive seman-
tics in the falsification process. Considering the established
robust semantics of STL formulas as the max semantics, the
difference for additive semantics is that the robustness of
each clause in a conjunction can affect the total robustness
of the conjunction, even if only one of the clause’s robustness
changes. Disjunction and temporal operators are defined in
terms of conjunction for the additive semantics.
To indicate the usability of additive semantics for falsifi-
cation, we have compared them to max semantics as well
as constant semantics (essentially only Boolean information
and no robustness) for several different models and spec-
ifications. The models we show results for are both well-
known benchmark models, as well as a simple non-dynamic
model to prove that all three choices of semantics can be the
most viable. Previous work on falsification has overlooked the
need to compare against the constant semantics as a baseline;
our evaluation made it clear that for some specifications,
falsification had no benefit over random testing. However,
for most cases excluding the system in Section V-D, it is
clear that constant semantics perform worse than the others,
indicating that robustness-based falsification is a reasonable
way of finding faults in CPSs.
Which of the three semantics performs best depends both
on the specification and the model. In a black-box setting, it
is thus difficult to decide which semantics to use for which
operator in the specification to get the best falsification results.
A. Future work
We have so far defined two semantics for Valued Booleans.
There are most likely many more, each with their own trade-
offs; we plan to explore these. Also, since the best choice
of semantics can be different for each connective in a given
specification, we would like to both
• formulate principles that can guide a tester in choosing a
suitable semantics for each operator in a given specifica-
tion, and
• analyze both the model and the specification to reason
about which semantics would be best for falsification (i.e.
grey-box or white-box testing).
Evaluating the effect of different robust semantics in falsi-
fication of generated specifications for the industrial examples
presented in this paper is also a path we plan to explore. A
more theoretical approach is about how the additive robustness
relates to the view of temporal logic as filtering. Finally, it
would be interesting to look at falsification which includes the
extra information that we get from the specification transfor-
mation presented in this paper – namely, the information about
all the preconditions that need to be fulfilled for different parts
of the specification to be evaluated.
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